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LESSONS FROM THE NORTH SEA: SHOULD 
“SAFETY CASES” COME TO AMERICA? 
Rena Steinzor* 
Abstract: The catastrophic oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last spring and 
summer has triggered an intense search for more effective regulatory 
methods that would prevent such disasters. The new Bureau of Ocean En-
ergy Management, Regulation and Enforcement is under pressure to 
adopt the British safety case system, which requires the preparation of a fa-
cility-specific safety plan that is typically several hundred pages long. This 
system is supposed to inculcate a “safety culture” within companies that 
operate offshore in the British portion of the North Sea, because it over-
comes a “box-ticking” mentality and constitutes “bottom up” implementa-
tion of safety measures. Safety cases are strictly confidential; only company 
officials, regulators, and, in limited circumstances, worker representatives, 
are allowed to see the entire plan. This Article argues that the safety case 
approach should not come to America because this confidentiality, as well 
as the levels of risk tolerated by the British system, conflict with the both 
the spirit and the letter of American law. American regulators also lack the 
resources necessary to make a safety case regime minimally successful. 
Introduction: The Search for New Regulatory Approaches 
 In the aftermath of the catastrophic oil spill at BP’s Deepwater Ho-
rizon facility in the Gulf of Mexico, American officials have launched a 
frantic search for more effective regulatory methods that would prevent 
such disasters. The European Union has also gotten into the act, threat-
ening to write its own set of prescriptive regulations for facilities located 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2011, Rena Steinzor, Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law. 
The author also serves as the President of the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) and was 
a co-author, along with symposium participants Alyson Flournoy, Holly Doremus, and several 
other CPR member scholars, of its publication Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures 
Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the System Can Be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence. Alyson 
Flournoy et al., Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 1007, Regulatory 
Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made the BP Disaster Possible, and How the 
System Can be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence 1–3, 13 (2010), available at http://www.pro- 
gressivereform.org/articles/BP_Reg_Blowout_1007.pdf. The author is additionally grateful 
for the invaluable editorial assistance of Alice Johnson, research fellow at the Thurgood Mar-
shall Law Library; the research assistance of Andrew Goldman and Summer Hughes Niazy; 
and the wise advice of Holly Doremus, Thomas McGarity, Rory O’Neill, Robert Percival, and 
Matthew Shudtz. 
417 
418 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:417 
in the North Sea.1 The special commission appointed by President 
Obama to investigate the Gulf spill recommended that American regu-
lators take a close look at the British system, which relies on one core 
mandate: every offshore operator shall prepare and update at five-year 
intervals a “safety case” tailored to the risks posed by individual facili-
ties.2 
 As explained by John Paterson and Greg Gordon, prominent Scot-
tish legal experts on oil and gas regulation in the North Sea, the British 
system developed in the wake of catastrophes offshore, beginning with 
the collapse of the Sea Gem platform in 1965, killing thirteen workers, 
and culminating in the worst offshore accident in history—the 1988 ex-
plosions aboard the Piper Alpha platform that claimed 167 lives.3 The 
system traveled an arduous trajectory from the “Early Phase” of a primi-
tive licensing regime where the authority responsible for promoting de-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Press Release, Günther Oettinger, European Union Comm’r for Energy, Offshore 
Drilling: European Comm’n Envisages EU Safety Rules (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http:// 
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1324; Malcolm Webb, Chief 
Executive of Oil & Gas UK stated that, “‘Oil & Gas UK is extremely concerned that once 
again, the EU Commission is calling for a suspension of new licensing . . . . It is also deeply 
worrying that in addition, it now proposes to implement centralized and prescriptive safety 
regulation.’” Press Release, Oil & Gas UK, European Commission’s Call for Suspension of 
Licensing in UK Wholly Unjustified (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.oilandgas 
uk.co.uk/news/news.cfm/newsid/551. Oil & Gas UK is the leading trade association that 
claims to represent the entire offshore sector. See About Us, Oil & Gas UK, http://www. 
oilandgasuk.co.uk/aboutus/aboutus.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
2 See Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling 252 (2011) 
[hereinafter BP Commission Report] (“The Department of the Interior should develop a 
proactive, risk-based performance approach specific to individual facilities, operations and 
environments, similar to the “safety case” approach in the North Sea.”); see also Letter from 
Deepwater Horizon Study Grp. to Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & 
Offshore Drilling (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/de- 
fault/files/documents/DHSG%20letter%2011%2024%2010.pdf; J. Robinson West, President 
& CEO of PFC Energy, Written Statement on History and Expansion of Offshore Drilling to 
the Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Meeting 2 
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Robinson%20West%20 Written%20Statement.pdf; see also H.R. 3534, 111th Cong. § 211 
(2010) (a bill introduced by Rep. Nick Rahall (D-WV) and passed by the House, requiring 
that a “safety case” be prepared in conjunction with each new application for a drilling lease 
in the Outer Continental Shelf); The Great Debate: A Safety Case Regime for U.S. Offshore Drilling 
and Production?, SPE Int’l, http://www.spegcs.org/en/cev/1795 (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) 
[hereinafter Great Debate Conference] (a website with materials from a conference sponsored by 
the Society of Petroleum Engineers, held in Houston, Texas on Sept. 16, 2010). 
3 See Oil and Gas Law—Current Practice and Emerging Trends 116 (Greg Gor-
don & John Paterson eds., 2007) [hereinafter Oil and Gas Law]; see also John Paterson, 
The Significance of Regulatory Orientation in Occupational Health and Safety Offshore, 38 B.C. 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 367, 369–79 (2011). 
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velopment was also expected to ensure safety; to a “Middle Phase” that 
Professor Paterson characterizes as an unsuccessful, short-lived experi-
ment with traditional, prescriptive regulation; to the “Late Phase” in 
which “duty holders” were told to craft and implement their own de-
tailed plans for avoiding catastrophe.4 The British call this approach 
“goal-oriented” regulation5 that is implemented through a “permission-
ing” system,6 although in American lexicon it would be described as a 
hybrid mix of “performance-based” regulation and voluntary self-
regulation. This shift of emphasis from prescriptive regulatory require-
ments to duty holder hegemony and relative autonomy was quite delib-
erate; the trade-off for the offshore industry was considerable flexibility 
in formulating the details of its compliance obligations. 
 Safety cases are defined as a “‘structured argument, supported by a 
body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid 
case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating 
environment.’”7 They are prepared either by consultants or company 
employees in accordance with an elaborate set of guidelines mandating 
that each document address in detail such disparate topics as: (1) pro-
cedures for controlling risks; (2) the selection and training of key per-
sonnel; (3) installation of preventive technologies such as emergency 
cut-off equipment; (4) procedures to control higher-risk events such as 
change of shifts, design, or production goals; (5) the operating firm’s 
control over the activities of subcontractors; and (6) how the entire 
crew of a given facility should respond in an emergency.8 
 Safety cases are expected to reduce safety risks to a level “as low as 
reasonably practical” (ALARP).9 Until 2003, guidance from the super-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Oil and Gas Law, supra note 3, at 116. Duty holders are the designated corpo-
rate entity that is responsible for the operation of offshore facilities. See id. 
5 Id. at 132–44 (describing the rise of goal-oriented regulation in the aftermath of Pip-
er Alpha). 
6 Health & Safety Exec., Policy Statement: Our Approach to Permissioning 
Regimes 2–3 (2003), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/permissioning.pdf. “Per-
missioning” is the term used by the British Health and Safety Executive to describe the 
approach it uses for all high-hazard industries. See id. Companies cannot operate hazard-
ous industries without receiving government permission, but remain responsible for de-
veloping facility-specific safety cases that govern both conduct and equipment. See id. 
7 J.R. Inge, Ministry of Defence, The Safety Case, Its Development and Use in 
the United Kingdom 2 (2007) (citation omitted), available at http://safety.inge.org.uk/ 
20070625-Inge2007_The_Safety_Case-U.pdf. 
8 See generally Health & Safety Exec., Assessment Principles for Offshore Safety 
Cases (APOSC) (2006) [hereinafter APOSC Regulations], available at http://www.hse.gov. 
uk/offshore/aposc190306.pdf. 
9 ALARP at a Glance, Health & Safety Executive, http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/ 
alarpglance.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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vising agency, the British Health and Safety Executive (HSE), translated 
this verbal formulation into two sets of numbers: (1) “an individual risk 
of death of 10¯³ [one in 1000] per year”;10 and (2) an “implied cost of 
averting a statistical fatality (ICAF)” generally measured as six times the 
value of each life saved, with a life worth £1 million (about $1.63 mil-
lion in April 2011).11 The revisions made in 2005 allowed the use of 
qualitative as well as quantitative risk analysis without changing the 
ALARP standard. However, no publicly available evidence indicates that 
this modification enhanced the protectiveness of such requirements.12 
A final feature of overriding importance in the British system is that all 
safety cases are held in the strictest confidence.13 No one except the 
consultants, top level management, the assigned agency official, and— 
in limited circumstances—a worker representative is allowed to see the 
finished document in its entirety. 
 I have no doubt that the British regulatory system has much to 
teach American regulators. The awkward fact remains that BP has his-
torically been one of the biggest operators of deep wells in the North 
Sea14 and is a veteran of that system. If safety cases truly inspire a perva-
sive safety culture that is based on a deeply ingrained corporate recog-
nition of the high costs of neglecting such procedures, how could this 
                                                                                                                      
10 APOSC Regulations, supra note 8, ¶ 39 (defining risk level of one in 1000 lives). 
11 Id. ¶¶ 58–59. 
12 Health & Safety Exec., A Guide to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) 
Regulations 2005, at 13 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter Guide to Offshore Installations], 
available at http://www.hseni.gov.uk/l30_a_guide_to_the_offshore_installations_safety_case_ 
regulations_2005.pdf. The Guide states, in a circular fashion, inter alia, that safety cases 
must demonstrate that “major hazard risks” are “identified and evaluated” and that “in 
respect to these risks, the ‘relevant statutory provisions’ will be complied with.” Id. In a 
letter critiquing an early version of this Article posted on the Social Science Research Net-
work (SSRN), Steve Walker, Head of the HSE Offshore Division, states that the 2005 deci-
sion to allow qualitative as well as quantitative analysis was significant, but he does not ex-
plain whether this modification has produced more rigorous safety requirements in the 
North Sea. Letter from Steve Walker, head, of HSE Offshore Div., to Rena Steinzor (Feb. 
25, 2011) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Walker Letter]. 
13 Mr. Walker’s letter does not dispute that safety cases are unavailable to the public, 
but does emphasize that “the installation operator or owner must genuinely attempt to 
seek the views and contributions of the workforce representatives.” Walker Letter, supra 
note 12, at 3. 
14 See Rowena Mason, Oil Spill: BP Reassures over Russian, North Sea Assets, Telegraph 
(London), June 23, 2010, at 11 (reporting on BP’s promises not to withdraw its major in-
vestments in the North Sea); Rowena Mason, BP: A Beginners Guide to the Company, Tele-
graph (London) ( June 22, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://tgr.ph/9GDMHG (reporting that: (1) 
until the Deepwater disaster, BP obtained eight percent of its oil from the North Sea; and 
(2) BP was Britain’s biggest company and the second largest oil company in the world, but 
as of June 2010, it slipped to the sixth largest oil company worldwide). 
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quintessentially British company have failed so abjectly to internalize 
these practices when it expanded its operations to the Gulf of Mexico? 
Remarkably insightful investigative journalism motivated by the Gulf 
spill, as well as independent reports on BP’s management style on-
shore, suggest that BP London headquarters maintained iron-clad con-
trol over its worldwide operations, imposing a rigorous cost-cutting re-
gime that very likely contributed to the Gulf catastrophe.15 In this 
context, it is fair to ask whether BP’s problems indicate that the British 
regulatory system fell short of inspiring the institutional metamorpho-
sis claimed by its proponents. 
 An attempt to answer these questions should inform American 
efforts to learn from British system. I argue here that far from provid-
ing a perfect model for future regulation, as its proponents suggest, the 
British safety case system is the wrong choice for America. 
 Rather than relying on facility-specific and abstract demonstrations 
of unacceptably high risk levels, American regulatory reform should 
focus on mandating the installation of the best available “failsafe” tech-
nology and teaching workers how to use it. Compliance documents 
should be transparent and available not just to regulators, but to private 
sector overseers who can hold them accountable, including inspectors 
general, the Government Accountability Office, public interest groups, 
the insurance industry, and investment firms. The imposition of strong 
civil and criminal liability is far more likely than safety cases to alter in-
dustry complacence and produce real safety improvements. 
 The remainder of this Article describes in more detail how the 
British system results in insufficiently protective and likely ineffective 
plans. It examines evidence indicating that the British regime is in 
trouble, including an HSE self-audit in 2005 that indicated profound 
gaps in the system’s effectiveness. This Article considers why the risk 
                                                                                                                      
15 See Siobhan Hughes & Stephen Power, BP Spill—Panel Staff Cites Management Failings, 
Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 2010, at A6 (reporting that BP’s cost-cutting moves in the years leading 
up to the spill created the maintenance conditions that contributed to it); Siobhan 
Hughes & Ben Casselman, BP Took Risk on Well Job: Investigator, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 2010, at 
A1 (reporting that BP removed a safeguard of heavy drilling mud before fully sealing the 
well with a cement plug, with the result that a crucial backup device was never installed); 
Frontline: The Spill (PBS television broadcast Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.pbs. 
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/the-spill/. Don Parus, the plant manager of BP’s largest refin-
ery in the United States, located in Texas City, Texas, made repeated trips to London to 
plead for relaxation of cost-cutting edicts because he was concerned about their implica-
tions for safety. Id. At one point he even presented a PowerPoint showing pictures of work-
ers who had died at the refinery in an effort to bolster his case. Id. However, his efforts 
were fruitless because on March 25, 2005, an explosion occurred that killed fifteen people 
at the Texas refinery. Id. 
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standards tolerated under the British system are inappropriate in the 
context of American law. It concludes that given the resource con-
straints plaguing the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regula-
tion and Enforcement—at the moment, it has approximately fifty-five 
to sixty inspectors to cover 3500 offshore facilities—wholesale adoption 
of the safety case regime will prove an expensive and negative distrac-
tion to American efforts to strengthen regulation offshore.16 
I. “It Can Get Very Complicated”17 
 The British government has grappled with the safety of deep well 
drilling for close to half a century, ever since the discovery of vast oil 
reserves in the North Sea in the late 1960s. The discovery was perceived 
as an economic miracle in Britain, staving off grave financial hardship 
and allowing the country to reclaim its position as an industrial power-
house within the European community.18 Few people looked this 
providential gift horse in the mouth and regulation in the North Sea 
was quite lax for many years because the government had no interest in 
interfering with the rapid development of oil resources.19 
 Oil rigs can be analogized to apartment houses operating on top of 
unpredictably active volcanoes. When aspects of oil production go 
wrong, they easily degenerate into tragedy. Two catastrophic accidents— 
Sea Gem in 1965 and, especially, Piper Alpha in 1988—provoked politi-
cal and social upheaval throughout Britain.20 In the wake of Piper Al-
pha, a report by Lord William Douglas Cullen21 roundly condemned 
the flaws of the regulatory system.22 Lord Cullen concluded that al-
                                                                                                                      
16 Leslie Eaton et al., Inspectors Adrift in Rig-Safety Push, Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 2010, at A1 
(reporting on the extraordinarily difficult challenges U.S. inspectors encounter when po-
licing safety in the Gulf of Mexico). 
17 ALARP at a Glance, supra note 9. 
18 Oil and Gas Law, supra note 3, at 117. 
19 Id. at 123–24; see Charles Woolfson et al., Paying for the Piper: Capital and La-
bour in Britain’s Offshore Oil Industry 19 (1997) (“Britain’s oil was to be extracted at 
the fastest rate possible, with limited state control and in conditions of close commercial 
partnership between American oil companies and banks and those of Britain.”). 
20 Woolfson et al., supra note 19, at 106–29, 301–27 (describing the Piper Alpha 
tragedy and its aftermath, especially the impact of these events on the British labor union 
movement). 
21 Lord Cullen is a former member of the Scottish judiciary with an impeccable repu-
tation for public service and integrity. See High Profile Judge’s Lockerbie Role, BBC News ( Jan. 
22, 2002, 4:31 PM), http://www.simonbaker.me/2/hi/in_depth/1775558.stm. 
22 Lord Cullen, The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster 1–5 (1990) 
[hereinafter Cullen Report] (presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for En-
ergy by command of Her Majesty). 
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though the British Department of Energy had inspected the facility in 
June 1987 and again in June 1988—only weeks before it blew into 
piec
ssing or monitoring 
crucial to establish the inde-
end
                                                                                                                     
es— 
those inspections were . . . superficial to the point of being of 
little use as a test of safety on the platform . . . [and] the evi-
dence led me to question, in a fundamental sense, whether 
the type of inspection practiced by the [Department of En-
ergy] could be an effective means of asse
the management of safety by operators.23 
Among the most important consequences of Lord Cullen’s report was 
the transfer of responsibility for controlling offshore safety hazards 
from the Department of Energy, which was also regarded as the oil in-
dustry’s “sponsoring” department, to the HSE, the English equivalent 
of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).24 
This separation of function was deemed 
p ence of regulatory oversight. 
 At the time of Piper Alpha, the British health and safety regulators 
were already in the throes of adopting goal-oriented regulation to re-
place prescriptive regulation. Proponents justified this transition by ar-
guing that if companies assumed responsibility for designing their own 
safety systems, they would embrace a “culture of safety” far more enthu-
siastically than if they were subject to rigid rules that led to mindless 
“box-ticking.”25 To develop redundant systems capable of preventing 
accidents on facilities operating in such a hostile environment would 
 
23 Id. at 3. 
24 Oil and Gas Law, supra note 3, at 124. 
25 Id. at 125. The term “box-ticking” is a label intended to connote profound disdain for 
a bureaucratic mindset that saps individual initiative and usurps corporate autonomy to the 
ultimate disadvantage of true safety. See, e.g., Angela Henshall, Deep Water, Deep Trouble, The Oil 
Industry Must Rethink Risk Management Procedures, Wall St. J. (Oct. 6, 2010, 4:05 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703453804575479643629599782.html 
(“Piper Alpha caused the UK industry to evolve in a very different direction to the U.S. It 
adopted a principals [sic] based approach rather than more prescriptive rule setting. Risk 
experts argue a more flexible, ‘goal-setting’ strategy has proved far better suited to achieving 
cost-effective solutions to offshore safety. They believe there are a number of disadvantages to 
a prescriptive approach that will need to be addressed in the Gulf of Mexico, not least that it 
encourages a box-ticking mentality.”); see also Phil Davis, Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Beyond Box-Ticking: A New Era for Risk Governance 4, 18–19 (2009), available at 
http://www.acegroup.com/Attachments/EIU_risk_survey-report-Sept_09.pdf (reporting on 
a worldwide survey of business leaders who decry the perils of the rigid “box-ticking” mental-
ity for the management of corporate financial risk that was prepared by staff of British maga-
zine The Economist). 
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ta  bottom-up, fully integrated cooperation by everyone on a rig, or so 
British policymakers reasoned. 
 The core requirements of such planning depend heavily on quan-
titative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis conducted as an inte-
gral part of the document and designed to reduce the cost of preven-
tive measures. The application of both methodologies in the context of 
safety cases is based on the statutory requirement that employers pro-
vide protection “so far as is reasonably practicable” (SFAIRP), which 
was originally established in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act of 
1974.
ke
efit balancing approach is 
 ro
quantitatively, using algorithms that appear to be largely the province 
of a cottage industry of consulting firms.30 Duty holders are also en-
                                                                                                                     
26 HSE has adopted its own regulatory mandate that risk offshore 
be reduced “as low as reasonably practical” (ALARP).27 At least so far as 
these verbal formulations go, their cost-ben
in ugh alignment with the analogous standard in the U.S. Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act (OSH Act).28 
 HSE instructs that safety cases should contain number crunching 
demonstrating that risks in any given area are not higher than one in 
1000 fatalities and that preventive measures—e.g., the installation of 
equipment and training programs—do not result in expenditures 
greater than £1 million (about $1.6 million).29 Additional guidance 
advises duty holders, who range from the company or companies that 
own the rig to the multiple contractors brought in to install and main-
tain drilling equipment, to calculate whether these numbers are met 
 
26 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, 1974, c. 37, § 2(1). HSE asserts that the statutory 
formulation—SFAIRP—and the regulatory formulation—ALARP—are “interchangeable,” 
but warns duty holders to mind their terminology when referring to either standard in 
“legal” documents. ALARP at a Glance, supra note 9. 
27 ALARP at a Glance, supra note 9. 
28 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2006) (employing a standard that takes into account fea-
sibility). 
29 APOSC Regulations, supra note 8, ¶ 39 (“An individual risk of death of 10¯3 per year 
has typically been used within the offshore industry as the maximum tolerable risk.”); id. ¶ 58 
(“HSE’s ‘Reducing Risks Protecting People’ document sets the value of a life at £1,000,000 
and by implication therefore the level at which the costs are disproportionate to the benefits 
gained.”). 
30 See Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) Checklist, Health & Safety Executive, http:// 
www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcheck.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011); HSE Principles for 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) in Support of ALARP Decisions, Health & Safety Executive, 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpcba.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). The 2005 
revisions to the ALARP guidance somewhat deemphasized the performance of quantitative 
risk assessment, acknowledging that some risks could be described qualitatively and that HSE 
had also prescribed requirements that must be implemented regardless of site-specific risk 
assessment. See APOSC Regulations, supra note 8, at 5 (“Changes to APOSC”). 
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couraged to refer to what is generally considered “good practice” at 
facilities like theirs.31 
 HSE documents are replete with exhortations that sound safety-
minded: 
In essence, making sure a risk has been reduced ALARP is 
about weighing the risk against the sacrifice needed to further 
reduce it. The decision is weighted in favour of health and 
safety because the presumption is that the duty-holder should 
implement the risk reduction measure. To avoid having to 
make this sacrifice, the duty-holder must be able to show that 
it would be grossly disproportionate to the benefits of risk re-
duction that would be achieved.32 
But the regulations also circumscribe expectations of how much com-
panies are required to spend on limiting risk, preventing accidents, and 
providing protection. For example, in an “Information Sheet” designed 
to explain how safety cases should “demonstrate compliance with the 
relevant statutory provisions,” HSE disclaims the “precautionary prin-
ciple,” viewed by many conservative commentators and industry repre-
sentatives as the source of needlessly expensive regulatory require-
ments that protect against risks that are far from certain: 
[I]nvocation of the precautionary principle may be appropri-
ate in addressing the introduction of genetically modified 
plants where there is good reason to believe that the modifica-
tions could lead to harmful effects on existing habitats, and 
there is a lack of knowledge about the relationship between 
hazard and the consequence. In the offshore industry the 
hazards and consequences are well understood and hence 
conventional assessment techniques can be used to evaluate 
the risks, using a cautionary approach rather than application of 
the precautionary principle. Therefore invocation of the pre-
                                                                                                                      
31 ALARP at a Glance, supra note 9 (“In most situations, deciding whether the risks are 
ALARP involves a comparison between the control measures a duty-holder has in place or 
is proposing and the measures we would normally expect to see in such circumstances i.e. 
relevant good practice. . . . We decide by consensus what is good practice through a proc-
ess of discussion with stakeholders, such as employers, trade associations, other Govern-
ment departments, trade unions, health and safety professionals and suppliers.”). 
32 ALARP at a Glance, supra note 9. 
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cautionary principle is extremely unlikely to be appropriate 
offshore.33 
 In 2005, HSE relaxed its rules, allowing duty holders to review 
safety cases once every five years rather than once every three years.34 
The rules were further loosened to provide that a safety case— para-
doxically described as a “living document” —lasts the life of a facility 
without being resubmitted for explicit approval to HSE, although duty 
holders continue to have the obligation to revise them “as appropri-
ate.”35 
 “It can get very complicated,” HSE adds, in a throwaway sentence 
that is inadvertently both humorous and exasperating.36 Safety cases are 
often “bulky.”37 A recent PowerPoint presentation by Kevin Kinsella, a 
safety case expert at Environmental Resources Management, a global 
consulting firm, estimates that the typical safety case for a medium-size 
North Sea production platform covers anywhere from 490 to 660 
pages.38 
 The entire system is summarized in the following diagram:39 
                                                                                                                      
33 Health & Safety Exec., Offshore Information Sheet No. 2/2006, Offshore In-
stallations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005: Regulation 12 Demonstrating Compli-
ance with the Relevant Statutory Provisions 7 (2006) [hereinafter Safety Case Reg-
ulations] (emphasis added), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/is2-2006.pdf. 
34 Guide to Offshore Installations, supra note 12, at 7. 
35 Id. at 12. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 11. 
38 Great Debate Conference, supra note 2 (follow “4. Kevin Kinsella_UK Offshore Safety 
Cases_Lessons Learnt.pdf” hyperlink at bottom of page). For further information about 
Environmental Resources Management, see About Us, Envtl. Res. Mgmt., http://www. 
erm.com/About-Us/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
39 Source: Safety Case Regulations, supra note 33, at 5. 
2011] Safety Cases: Lessons from the North Sea? 427 
 
 Lengthy documents are common in the regulatory world. How-
ever, the longer and more technical such documents become, the 
greater the need for them to be digested and implemented by highly 
trained technical experts. The real question is whether safety cases writ-
ten by and for highly skilled engineers can be translated into meaning-
ful changes in behavior among workers who differ greatly in education. 
The more dense and complex the document, the greater the effort re-
quired to implement it among the large majority of workers who lack 
such advanced technical training. 
II. But Does the Safety Case System Work? 
 Because no major catastrophes have occurred in the British sec-
tion of the North Sea since Piper Alpha, it is tempting to conclude that 
the system is working, at least to the extent of preventing such hazards.
 However, two indicators suggest that Britain’s safety case system is 
not nearly as effective as it may appear. The first is a damning indict-
ment of overall safety consciousness offshore prepared by HSE auditors 
on the basis of inspections of 100 individual facilities.40 The second in-
volves figures compiled by the International Association of Drilling 
Contractors (IADC) showing routine offshore injury rates in Britain 
and the United States.41 These figures reveal a less disparate safety re-
                                                                                                                      
40 Health & Safety Exec., Key Programme 3: Asset Integrity Programme 5 
(2007) [hereinafter KP 3 Report], available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/kp3.pdf. 
41 See infra Part II.B. 
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cord than we might expect given the supposedly superior British regu-
latory system. 
A. HSE’s Self-Audit 
 From 2005 to 2007, prompted by concerns that the North Sea in-
frastructure was aging rapidly and that new, relatively inexperienced 
companies were assuming control of many North Sea facilities as the 
largest players moved to more lucrative production sites around the 
globe, HSE reviewed maintenance practices with respect to “Safety Criti-
cal Elements” that are installed to “prevent, control, or mitigate major 
hazards.”42 Its report, entitled Key Programme 3 (KP 3 Report ), was ex-
tremely troubling, concluding that at more than fifty percent of the 100 
installations inspected, the state of the physical plant was “poor.”43 The 
report’s anonymous authors dismissed out of hand the oil industry’s 
defense that these problems occurred only in non-safety-critical aspects 
of the infrastructure: “This [claim] illustrates a lack of understanding in 
many parts of the industry that degraded non-safety-critical plant and 
utility systems can impact on safety critical elements in the event of a 
major accident reducing their performance.”44 
 Beyond concerns such as whether rusting external stairs could col-
lapse in the event of a fire, the KP 3 Report inspectors found that systems 
critical to the survival of the workforce during major accidents were in 
terrible shape.45 For example, HSE inspectors tested so-called “TR 
HVAC” systems, the mechanical means by which a compartment con-
taining people can be closed off from the incursion of flammable and 
toxic gases during an explosion or fire.46 Such systems failed to some 
degree in sixty-four percent of such tests, revealing a “picture of inade-
                                                                                                                      
42 See KP 3 Report, supra note 40, at 8. (“The offshore oil and gas industry in the UK 
Continental Shelf (UKCS) is a mature production area. Much of the offshore infrastruc-
ture is at, or has exceeded, its intended design life. During the 1990s low oil prices and 
initiatives to reduce costs led to a reduction in the offshore workforce. This in turn led to 
reductions in levels of maintenance and, as a result, an overall decline in the integrity of 
fabric, structures, plant and systems.”); see also Walker Letter, supra note 12, at 3. 
43 KP 3 Report, supra note 40, at 7. 
44 Id. Unlike most American government reports, HSE documents are devoid of the 
names of individual officials who wrote them or who can be contacted for further informa-
tion. See Publications, Health & Safety Executive, http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/index. 
htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
45 KP 3 Report, supra note 40, at 16. 
46 See id. at 7, 16. 
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quate testing and very poor reliability” for a critical component of 
emergency response.47 
 As for the notion that safety cases are living documents that instill 
an ongoing commitment to the prevention of major hazards, the KP 3 
Report concluded that managers of offshore facilities rely far too exten-
sively on “operational risk assessments” —that is, theoretical modeling 
of how workers are supposed to react—to compensate for degraded 
infrastructure.48 The report also noted that at many facilities, “per-
formance standards” —the fundamental building block of safety cases 
and their implementation—were “generic in nature without being spe-
cific and measurable.”49 The report elaborated: 
                                                                                                                     
Examples of measureable criteria are valve maximum closure 
times and maximum allowable leak rates. An example of not 
being specific was where a dutyholder used the same performance 
standard across all their installations and there were differences 
in the actual systems on the installation that required changes 
to functionality.50 
 Of course, the problem of cut-and-paste generic standards in safety 
protocols emerged with savage irony in the aftermath of the BP Gulf 
spill, when the Associated Press discovered that the company’s spill pre-
vention control plan included: a discussion of the consequences of a 
spill for walruses, when such animals do not live in the area; the name 
of a deceased consultant on a list of experts to consult in the event of a 
spill; and a series of disconnected or wrong phone numbers as contacts 
during an emergency response.51 
 In addition to overreliance on cookie-cutter prototypes of critical 
documentation, the HSE team mentions repeatedly that severe “skills 
shortages” in engineering disciplines have accelerated corporate inat-
tention to infrastructure maintenance.52 The shortage, described as a 
 
47 Id. at 17. 
48 See id. at 6. 
49 Id. at 21. 
50 Id. (emphasis added). 
51 Holbrook Mohr et al., BP’s Gulf Oil Spill Response Plan Lists the Walrus as a Local Spe-
cies. Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal Is Furious., Christian Sci. Monitor, June 9, 2010, http:// 
www.csmonitor.com/From-the-news-wires/2010/0609/BP-s-gulf-oil-spill-response-plan-lists-
the-walrus-as-a-local-species.-Louisiana-Gov.-Bobby-Jindal-is-furious. 
52 KP 3 Report, supra note 40, at 7, 12 (describing the dearth of technicians offshore, 
both because facility operators do not have enough employees with such skills and because 
of limited “bed space” —rooms that can accommodate visitors in addition to the perma-
nent crew—aboard such facilities). 
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“problem of the industry’s own making,” began in the 1990s when low 
oil prices prompted companies to “shed significant numbers of onshore 
and offshore workers.”53 This kind of reaction is a strong indicator of a 
weak and ineffective regulatory regime that does not exert sufficient 
pressure on corporate decisions to eliminate, for profit-driven reasons, 
the human and technological resources essential to achieving compli-
ance. 
 In July 2009, HSE issued a follow-up “review report” (KP 3 Review) 
on the offshore industry’s progress in responding to the findings in its 
KP 3 Report.54 This review involved a sharply circumscribed methodology 
in comparison to the original report, relying to a significant extent on 
information provided by offshore companies.  For example, HSE only 
inspected five facilities to check on their progress in addressing the 
safety concerns it found during the 100 inspections it conducted for KP 
3 Report.55 The review concludes that “leadership is now firmly on the 
industry’s agenda” and that “progress has been made in key areas, which 
may produce a positive impact on safety culture offshore.”56 With some-
what less equivocation, HSE concludes that “strong evidence” indicates 
that the most serious “red traffic light” problems identified in its original 
report were “closed satisfactorily.”57 The KP 3 Review does not explain 
further how HSE can have such confidence given the limited number of 
follow-up inspections that were conducted. 
B. British and American Safety Records 
 In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, investigations of 
the chain of events that produced the disaster came to discouraging 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the American regulatory system.58 
Press accounts demonstrated that the Minerals Management Service 
(MMS) was a captive of the U.S. oil industry.59 The oil spill commission 
appointed by President Obama concluded: 
                                                                                                                      
53 Id. at 28. 
54 Health & Safety Exec., Key Programme 3: Asset Integrity, A Review of In-
dustry’s Progress (2009), available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/offshore/kp3review.pdf. 
55 Id. at 9. 
56 Id. at 4. 
57 Id. at 3. 
58 See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Minerals Service Had a Mandate to Produce Results, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 8, 2010, at A1 (“The causes of the spill remain unclear, but a number of the agency’s 
actions have drawn fire . . . . The story has gained a bacchanal gloss because agency em-
ployees in Louisiana and Colorado took meals, gifts and sporting trips paid for by the in-
dustry, and several Colorado officials had sex and used drugs with industry employees.”). 
59 Id. 
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The blowout was not the product of . . . aberrational decisions 
made by rogue industry or government officials . . . . Rather, 
the root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in 
both industry practices and government policies, might well 
recur. The missteps were rooted in systemic failures by industry 
management (extending beyond BP to contractors that serve 
many in the industry), and also by failures of government to 
provide effective regulatory oversight of offshore drilling.60 
In short order, the benighted agency was renamed the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE).61 But 
the renaming has yet to enhance the agency’s reputation. It continues 
to labor under the strong impression left by the Gulf spill that regula-
tory oversight offshore approaches the end of the continuum where no 
effective government controls are maintained over offshore operations. 
 It is somewhat disconcerting, then, to discover that, according to 
statistics compiled by the International Association of Drilling Contrac-
tors (IADC), a trade association with scant motivation to exaggerate 
safety problems, the rates of offshore injuries in the United States and 
Europe were not as disparate as one might suppose they would be given 
the claims made about the efficacy of the British regulatory system. The 
IADC reports cover only the drilling industry, are submitted voluntarily, 
and are not audited.62 Here are those statistics for the reporting periods 
in 2007, 2008, and 2009:63 
                                                                                                                      
60 BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 122. 
61 U.S. Sec’y of the Interior, Order No. 3302, Change of the Name of the Minerals Man-
agement Service to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement 
( June 18, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule= 
security/getfile&PageID=35872. 
62 ASP Report Disclaimer, Int’l Ass’n Drilling Contractors (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.iadc.org/asp/2009%20Annual%20Report/ASPREPORTDISCLAIMER.htm. 
63 Source: Incident Statistics Program, Int’l Ass’n Drilling Contractors, http://www. 
iadc.org/asp.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
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U.S. Waters 
 2009 2008 2007 
Total Man Hours 33,501,661 39,665,580 39,701,950 
Total Medical Treatment Incidents 72 118 115 
Total Restricted Work Incidents 40 100 97 
Total Lost Time Incidents 32 26 56 
Total Fatalities 2 3 0 
Total Recordables 146 247 268 
LTI Rate64 0.20 0.15 0.28 
 
European Waters 
 2009 2008 2007 
Total Man Hours 32,947,340 38,049,523 35,007,255 
Total  Medical Treatment Incidents 48 95 81 
Total Restricted Work Incidents 24 43 42 
Total Lost Time Incidents 48 51 72 
Total Fatalities 1 0 0 
Total Recordables 121 189 195 
LTI Rate 0.30 0.27 0.41 
 
 The 2009 statistics were reported in a PowerPoint presentation by 
Ken Arnold, senior technical advisor to Worley Parsons, a global engi-
neering firm.65 His presentation was part of a conference sponsored by 
the Society of Petroleum Engineers and held in Houston, Texas on Sep-
tember 16, 2010.66 The conference appears to have been designed to 
provide an opportunity for global consultants familiar with the British 
system to sing its praises before American oil industry professionals.67 
But Arnold actually opposed adoption of the safety case regime, argu-
ing that “accidents are avoided by people operating in supportive or-
ganizations” and that the oil industry in America does “NOT need an-
other level of analysis and documentation.”68 
 Of course, routine injury rates are not a perfect proxy for “process 
safety,” a term of art in the engineering profession that connotes the 
                                                                                                                      
64 “Lost time incidence” (LTI) is defined as a work-related incident (injury or illness) 
to an employee in which a physician or licensed health care professional recommends days 
away from work due to the incident. 
65 See generally Ken Arnold, Production Operations—The Need for a Safety Case, Ad-
dress Before the Society of Petroleum Engineers, Gulf Coast Section (Sept. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.spegcs.org/en/cev/1795 (follow “2. Ken Arnold _Safety Case Proc-
ess in Production Operations.pdf” hyperlink at bottom of page). 
66 See id.; Great Debate Conference, supra note 2. 
67 See Great Debate Conference, supra note 2. 
68 Arnold, supra note 65, at 34. 
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failure of manufacturing systems involving the use or extraction of ex-
tremely hazardous substances.69 Individual workers may be hurt on the 
job despite the implementation of a sophisticated management system 
that is designed to prevent major mistakes in the system for processing 
chemicals or producing oil offshore.70 Workers may underreport inju-
ries for a variety of reasons, including the fear of retaliation from su-
pervisors seeking to cover up hazardous conditions.71 However, even if 
catastrophes are not on a straight linear continuum with inordinate 
daily injuries, poor maintenance, and weak regulatory controls, they 
are a foreseeable result of the cumulative consequences of neglect in 
those areas. 
 It is also true that accidents are possible, even at companies with 
strong safety cultures. Yet analyses of the aftermath of major industrial 
catastrophes never conclude that a shipshape company, with a strong 
safety culture, operating in a rigorous regulatory environment, was in 
fact ambushed by a freak instance of bad luck. Instead, report after re-
port concludes that the absence of a strong regulatory presence and 
corporate neglect of safety at the highest levels were quid pro quos for 
accidents that were waiting to happen.72 Poor maintenance and signifi-
cant injury rates are reliable indicators that instilling a safety culture— 
the ostensible goal of the British system—remains elusive offshore.73 
III. Conflicting Values in the Law 
 The fundamental principles of British and American worker pro-
tection laws are superficially similar—agencies are instructed to balance 
anticipated risks against the costs of reducing them.74 These mandates 
have produced a pervasive reliance on quantitative risk assessment in 
both countries. But as implemented in the context of offshore regula-
                                                                                                                      
69 See Andrew Hopkins, Thinking About Process Safety Indicators, 47 Safety Sci. 460, 460 
(2009) (explaining the differences between process safety and personal safety at work). 
70 See id. 
71 See, e.g., Telos Group, BP Texas City Site Report of Findings 8 (2005), available 
at http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/the-telos-report. 
72 See e.g., BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at vii; Cullen Report, supra note 22, 
at 1–5. 
73 See Ben Ale, More Thinking About Process Safety Indicators, 47 Safety Sci. 470, 470 
(2009) (“[S]ometimes the frequency of small scale accidents can be an indicator for the 
probability of a large one.”). 
74 Compare Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, 1974, c. 37, § 2(1) (U.K.) (charging 
employers to ensure employee health and safety “so far as is reasonably practicable”), with 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655(b)(5) (2006) 
(setting standards “which most adequately assure, to the extent feasible” the health and 
safety of employees). 
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tion, these surface similarities diverge in two key respects. Substantively, 
the British have been willing to tolerate a risk standard—one in 10¯³ 
(one in 1000)75—that is significantly less protective than what Ameri-
can regulators, instructed by court decisions, are allowed to accept. 
Procedurally, the British are willing to delegate to industry the role of 
performing quantitative risk assessments on individual facilities, while 
American regulators generally conduct their own analyses and apply 
them in the context of industry-wide rulemaking. 
A. The British Reliance on Numbers 
 The British Health and Safety at Work etc. Act of 1974 requires 
protection “so far as is reasonably practicable” (SFAIRP).76 This stan-
dard is based upon a 1949 case, Edwards v. National Coal Board, decided 
by the Court of Appeal, Britain’s equivalent of the United States Su-
preme Court.77 The case involved a worker in a coal mine who was 
killed by a collapsing wall of coal mining waste on the side of a road 
where he was walking; his widow won the case in the highest court after 
having lost it below.78 In the passage commonly considered to be the 
most significant in the opinion, Judge Asquith wrote: 
“Reasonably practicable” is a narrower term than “physically 
possible” and seems to me to imply that a computation must 
be made by the owner, in which the quantum of risk is placed 
on one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures neces-
sary for averting the risk (whether in money, time or trouble) 
is placed in the other; and that if it be shown that there is a 
gross disproportion between them—the risk being insignifi-
cant in relation to the sacrifice—the defendants discharge the 
onus on them. Moreover, this computation falls to be made by 
the owner at a point of time anterior to the accident.79 
                                                                                                                      
75 APOSC Regulations, supra note 8, ¶ 39. 
76 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act § 2(1). HSE asserts that the statutory formula-
tion—SFAIRP—and the regulatory formulation—ALARP—are “interchangeable,” but 
warns duty holders to mind their terminology when referring to either standard in “legal” 
documents. ALARP at a Glance, supra note 9. 
77 [1949] 1 K.B. 704 (Eng.). Excellent background on the British Court system is pro-
vided by the Library of Congress. Legal Research Guide: United Kingdom, Libr. Congress, 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk.php (last updated Aug. 30, 2010). 
78 Edwards, [1949] 1 K.B. at 712. 
79 Id. at 704. 
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 As discussed earlier, HSE obtained jurisdiction over offshore work 
from the Department of Energy in 1992 and was immediately con-
fronted with the need to further interpret what level of risk was accept-
able in an industry that represented a crucial engine for the country’s 
economy, but that was compelled to operate in an environment as dan-
gerous as it was unforgiving. The result was the “as low as reasonably 
practicable” standard that has been interpreted to establish one in 1000 
deaths and a value of £1 million per life as the minimum levels of risk 
to be tolerated.80 Although HSE announced in 2005 that it would rely 
less on quantitative risk assessment, giving industry the flexibility to use 
qualitative (or non-numerical) assessments in safety cases,81 this flexibil-
ity is unlikely to result in any meaningful increase in the levels of pro-
tection provided to workers on rigs and platforms because HSE has not 
required any change in the substantive standard it will use to judge 
safety cases for the small number of new wells drilled each year.82 
B. The United States’ More Protective Approach 
 The central judicial interpretation of the levels of protection re-
quired by the OSH Act83 is the 1980 Supreme Court decision in AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, commonly known as the Benzene deci-
sion.84 The case involved an OSHA decision to set the “permissible ex-
posure limit” (PEL) for benzene at one part per million (ppm) in air.85 
The Court reversed and remanded the decision, concluding that 
OSHA’s evidence did not rise to the level of proving a “significant 
risk”86—its interpretation of the statutory standard that the agency 
should adopt rules that are “reasonably necessary or appropriate” using 
the “best available evidence” to assure that “to the extent feasible” that 
“no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity.”87 The Court also discussed the question of how to measure 
risk levels numerically: 
                                                                                                                      
80 See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
81 See Walker Letter, supra note 12. 
82 See KP 3 Report, supra note 40, at 8 (explaining that the North Sea is a “mature pro-
duction area” where new investment in discovering and extracting oil is unlikely to occur). 
83 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2006). 
84 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
85 Id. at 632. 
86 Id. at 653. 
87 Id. at 612. This paraphrase of the statute’s mandate is based on sections 3(8) and 
6(b)(5) of the OSH Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655(b)(5). 
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[T]he requirement that a “significant” risk be identified is not 
a mathematical straitjacket. It is the Agency’s responsibility to 
determine, in the first instance, what it considers to be a “sig-
nificant” risk. . . . If, for example, the odds are one in a billion 
that a person will die from cancer by taking a drink of chlo-
rinated water, the risk clearly could not be considered signifi-
cant. On the other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand 
that regular inhalation of gasoline vapors that are 2% ben-
zene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well consider the 
risk significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or 
eliminate it.88 
Seven years after remand, OSHA lowered the benzene limit after the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer concluded that workers 
exposed to ten to 100 ppm of benzene faced an excess leukemia risk of 
170 per 1000.89 
 Like the OSH Act, other American health, safety, and environ-
mental statutes and regulations almost always establish through verbal 
formulations the levels of protection to be provided to the public as a 
whole and workers in particular. In fact, American statutes contain only 
two examples of such numerical standards, both of which tolerate no 
more than a one in 1,000,000 level of risk. The first is section 
408(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Food Quality Protection Act, interpreting the 
statutory standard of a “reasonable certainty of no harm,”90 and the 
second is section 112 of the Clean Air Act, setting the maximum level of 
exposure for the “most exposed” individuals in the context of limiting 
exposure to carcinogens.91 Both of these provisions appear in sections 
of the statutes that do not allow the balancing of costs and benefits, and 
they involve the protection of the general public, not workers.92 All the 
same, congressional unwillingness to embrace a higher numerical level 
of risk is worth noting. 
                                                                                                                      
88 Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655. 
89 Robert V. Percival et al., Environmental Regulation, Law, Science, and Pol-
icy 211 (6th ed. 2009). 
90 See Food Quality Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
91 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9) (2006) (providing for the delisting of source 
categories that emit carcinogens); id. § 7412(f)(2) (authorizing the EPA Administrator to 
regulate sources of carcinogens if Congress does not act). 
92 See 21 U.S.C. § 346; 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
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C. Comparing the Systems 
 The British comfort with numbers—especially a risk level meas-
ured as one in 1000 deaths and a value per life lost of £1 million—is 
striking, as is HSE’s willingness to delegate the chore of deciding what 
actions to take to meet these numerical standards. Of course numerical 
risk factors, such as risk levels in deaths per thousands and cost-benefit 
analysis as dollars per statistical life, are routinely incorporated in 
documents used as the basis for regulation in the United States, includ-
ing regulatory impact assessments prepared by the government.93 
However, I have been able to find only two examples where an Ameri-
can agency used numerical risk levels to explain how a final regulation 
would work.94 Embracing such numbers in safety cases largely as substi-
tutes for regulation reflects comfort with the reliability of the method-
ologies used to produce such numbers, a comfort that American regu-
lators are rightly unwilling to accept. 
 As for the British regulatory system’s decision to value a worker’s 
life at £1 million,95 this figure is 5.5 times lower than the $8.8 million 
“Value of Statistical Life” (VSL) used by the Environmental Protection 
                                                                                                                      
93 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for EPA’s Proposed RCRA Regula-
tion of Coal Combustion Residues (CCR) Generated by the Electric Utility Industry 
121–22 (2010) [hereinafter EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis for RCRA], available at http:// 
www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=0900006480ae5d01. 
94 The first example is the EPA’s efforts to set a lifetime exposure risk for airborne 
benzene for the general population where it set up a system that established a “maximum 
level of a pollutant for a lifetime” (MIR) of one in 10,000 as “acceptable” and then prom-
ised to consider other health and safety factors in making a final regulatory determination. 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 38,044, 38,048 (Sept. 14, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). “The presumptive level 
provides a benchmark for judging the acceptability of maximum individual risk (‘MIR’), 
but does not constitute a rigid line for making that determination.” Percival et al., supra 
note 89, at 291. The second is OSHA’s use of such figures in explaining how it sets permis-
sible exposure levels (PELs) for toxic chemicals, which is typified by its Federal Register no-
tice for the final rule controlling workplace exposures to hexavalent chromium. Occupa-
tional Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 10,225 tbl.VII-2 (Feb. 28, 
2006) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918, 1926). The rule’s preamble con-
tains a table showing the risk estimates following the imposition of OSHA PELs for a series 
of chemicals, including ethylene oxide, asbestos, benzene, formaldehyde, methylenediani-
line, cadmium, 1,3-butadiene, methylene chloride, and chromium VI. Id. The table indi-
cates risks as high as ten per 1000 workers that would occur if a worker was exposed con-
tinuously to benzene at a level equivalent to the relevant PEL over a forty-five year period, 
although most of the estimated recorded risks were significantly lower than this figure. Id. 
OSHA does not assert that this level of risk is acceptable. Rather, it states that these levels 
of risk are “significant,” but were nevertheless tolerated in its past rules. Id. 
95 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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Agency (EPA) in recent rulemakings.96 The figure is one-third of the 
lowest VSL used by other agencies, such as the Department of Trans-
portation and the Department of Health and Human Services, in con-
ducting cost-benefit analyses.97 
D. Secrecy 
 Last but not least, we have the question of how U.S. law deals with 
confidentiality of permitting regimes, the closest analogy to a safety 
case in the American system. Individual permits under the Clean Air 
Act and Clean Water Act, as well as other federal environmental stat-
utes, are written to govern how regulated activities must be conducted 
at a specific facility—for example, how many and what types of air pol-
lutants may be emitted,98 or the content and amount of effluent that 
may be discharged from a point source to surface waters.99 Those per-
mits are always available to the public.100 Similarly, Congress has evi-
denced a clear intent that rulemaking remain as transparent as possi-
ble.101 In accord is President Obama’s often stated commitment to 
                                                                                                                      
96 EPA Regulatory Impact Analysis for RCRA, supra note 93, at 121. 
97 John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 395, 403, 465, 497 (2008) (noting that, according to the author, who was the director 
of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) responsible for reviewing the 
economic impact of proposed regulations for President George W. Bush, OIRA advised 
agencies in 2003 to use VSLs ranging from one million dollars to ten million dollars, but 
states that the lower-end figures actually used ranged from three to five million dollars). In 
a recent report on the costs and benefits achieved by the Clean Air Act, the EPA used $7.4 
million as the VSL in 2010. Office of Air & Radiation, U.S. EPA, The Benefits and 
Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1990 to 2020, at 5–20 (2010), available at http://www.epa. 
gov/oar/sect812/aug10/fullreport.pdf. 
98 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (2006) (discussing the Clean Air Act permitting requirements for 
nonattainment areas). 
99 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (establishing the Clean Water Act’s national pollut-
ant discharge elimination system permitting program). 
100 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(j); 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(viii) (2009) (requiring that 
Clean Water Act and Clean Air Actpermits be made available to the public). 
101 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(“The requirement of public participation in efforts to control water pollution is estab-
lished in the congressional declaration of policy and goals of the Act . . . . The legislative 
history of the Act repeatedly echoes the desire ‘that its provisions be administered and 
enforced in a fishbowl-like atmosphere.’”); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Reg. 
Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In order to allow for useful criticism [in 
rulemaking], it is especially important for the agency to identify and make available tech-
nical studies and data that it has employed in reaching the decisions to propose particular 
rules. To allow an agency to play hunt the peanut with technical information, hiding or 
disguising the information that it employs, is to condone a practice in which the agency 
treats what should be a genuine interchange as mere bureaucratic sport.”). 
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“open and transparent” government.102 A secret system for offshore 
safety cases would flout all of these well-established regimes, practices, 
and policies. 
Conclusion: Future Directions 
 The best possible scenario for a safety case regime is that the own-
ers and operators of offshore facilities take the preparation of such 
documents very seriously, to the point that the process of drafting them 
inculcates an effective safety culture from the top of the organization 
down and from the bottom of the organization up.  The worst possible 
scenario is that safety cases are outsourced to consultants and devolve 
into cut-and-paste renditions of standard form reports, allowing the 
documents to be completed and filed without having any significant 
impact on the safety of the facility.  In the absence of constant, stringent 
supervision by regulators, safety case regimes are unlikely to result in 
more than unsupervised exercises in self-regulation that fall at the 
worst scenario end of the spectrum most of the time. 
 On December 15, 2010, the United States Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board (the “Chemical Safety Board”) held a pub-
lic hearing on “regulatory approaches to offshore oil and gas safety,” 
which involved testimony by senior regulators from Norway, Britain, 
and Australia, as well as by Dr. Andrew Hopkins, a world-renowned ex-
pert in the incentives that inspire the inculcation of safety culture 
within high-hazard industries.103 All of these experts stressed that the 
success of safety case regimes depended on the capacity of regulators to 
provide concrete incentives for companies to take the preparation and 
implementation of such documents seriously. First and foremost, regu-
lators must have adequate resources in terms of the number and qual-
ity of the staff that is available to review the adequacy of safety cases, 
inspect facilities on a frequent basis, and bring swift enforcement action 
against violators. The operation of an offshore oil production facility is 
                                                                                                                      
102 See, e.g., Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: 
Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 ( Jan. 26, 2009) (“My Ad-
ministration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government. 
We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, 
public participation, and collaboration.”). 
103 U.S. Chem. Safety & Hazard Bd., Public Hearing, Regulatory Approaches to 
Offshore Oil and Gas Safety 1–2, 7 (2010) [hereinafter CSB Safety Case Tran-
script], available at http://www.csb.gov/assets/document/Transcript_of_Public_Meeting_ 
12_15_2010.pdf. See generally Andrew Hopkins, Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City 
Refinery Disaster (2008) (analyzing the failure of management systems that led to an 
explosion at this refinery in 2005, killing fifteen workers). 
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enormously complex from a technical perspective, requiring an inter-
disciplinary team of well-trained experts.104 A thorough inspection of 
such facilities can take several days and involve a multi-disciplinary 
team of several inspectors.105  As Dr. Hopkins put it: 
[A successful safety case regime] requires a highly competent 
and well resourced and independent regulator. Without a well 
resourced regulator safety case is no better than any alterna-
tive.  Indeed, in some cases it can be worse.  So any decision 
to introduce a safety vase regime must involve a commitment 
to ensure proper funding. 
 . . . . 
 . . .[A] safety case regime is worthless unless the regulator is 
properly funded.106 
 As for the importance of a deterrence-based regime that does not 
place the regulator in the position of counseling offshore owners and 
operators into compliance without creating the incentive for compa-
nies to take the preparation and implementation of safety cases seri-
ously in the first instance, John Clegg, the retired head of the Austra-
lian National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority, told the Chemical 
Safety Board: 
The employer treats the whole process [the safety case re-
gime] as a necessary evil to get a tick in the box and the 
regulator to operate, i.e. they see it as an impediment to op-
eration. The employer treats it as a one-off event—it’s only a 
piece of paper, isn’t it . . . . 
 Initially, we tried to work with industry to improve their 
safety cases. We did that for about 18 months.  But we found 
that in the end the operators were . . . using the regulator as 
a free consultant. So we stopped that. And we just moved 
straight through rejection.  And I think in the first year after 
we rejected half-dozen or so safety cases. And that certainly 
                                                                                                                      
104 CSB Safety Case Transcript, supra note 103 at 26–27 (describing the technical 
complexity of oil production offshore). 
105 As former British regulator Ian Whewell told the Chemical Safety Board, HSE typi-
cally conducted a “three-day inspection with three to four inspectors in various disciplines 
with areas identified prior to the visit as being a priority and needing review and needing 
to be properly looked at.” Id. at 120. 
106 Id. at 35–36. 
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brought the attention of the industry to the need to do a bet-
ter job.107 
 The regulators testifying before the Chemical Safety Board did not 
explicitly address how to ensure that regulators remain independent in 
relationship to the oil and gas industries. But it is worth noting that for 
the British in the wake of the Piper Alpha disaster, the separation of the 
functions of leasing drilling rights and overseeing the safety of such op-
erations was deemed crucial to the effectiveness of the latter work. The 
regulators also did not address whether the confidentiality of safety 
cases was consistent with the fundamental values that define the Ameri-
can regulatory system, but I would add that principle to the list of the 
conditions precedent for an effective safety case regime. 
 At the moment and for the foreseeable future, the United States 
does not come close to satisfying any of these preconditions. The sup-
posedly momentous conversion of MMS into BOEMRE did not trans-
late into increased effectiveness in the actual policing of the over 3500 
oil platforms and drilling rigs now located in the Gulf of Mexico. Inves-
tigative reporting by the Wall Street Journal on December 3, 2010, was 
grim regarding the true significance of the reorganization, noting that 
BOEMRE was only able to field a “small cadre” of fifty-five inspectors 
armed with “checklists and pencils” to cover the entire offshore indus-
try, resulting in the daunting ratio of one inspector for every sixty-three 
offshore facilities.108 
[T]hese inspectors have been overruled by industry, under-
mined by their own managers and outmatched by the sheer 
number of offshore installations they oversee. Inspectors come 
into the job with little or no hands-on experience in deep-
water drilling, learning as they go. 
 [They] are largely checking hardware [and] get good 
marks for reducing workplace injuries on rigs and platforms.  
But safety experts say the main causes of major accidents are 
almost always human error, not the mechanical failure that 
inspectors focus on.  Inspectors aren’t looking for signs of sys-
temic safety problems—poor decisions, cutting corners, mud-
dled responsibilities—that investigators are linking to the 
Deepwater Horizon explosions. 
  . . . . 
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108 Eaton et al., supra note 16. 
442 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 38:417 
 No one knows if a more robust and sophisticated inspection 
program could have detected [the problems that caused the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster] explosion. But there is broad 
agreement among safety experts that a massive overhaul is 
needed to create the kind of inspection program that can 
help avoid such disasters in the future.109 
 I will go out on a sturdy limb and predict that a significant expan-
sion of BOEMRE’s budget is unlikely in the foreseeable future. My evi-
dence for this prediction is fourfold: (1) the results of the 2010 election 
that granted conservative Republicans a decisive majority in the House 
of Representatives and a significantly stronger hand in the operation of 
the Senate; (2) congressional failure to pass legislation to strengthen 
the government’s ability to police offshore and authorize higher fund-
ing levels, even in the wake of the worst environmental disaster in 
American history; (3) President Obama’s refusal thus far to recognize 
the crisis in performance that afflicts every agency responsible for pre-
serving public health, safety, and the environment; and (4) the oil in-
dustry’s remarkable refusal to acknowledge problems offshore.110 As-
suming BOEMRE will be compelled to stumble along as best it can, 
adoption of a safety case regime is not likely to improve offshore safety 
and could actually prove counterproductive. 
 In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, the Wall Street 
Journal reported that investors around the world were anxiously de-
manding evidence that “companies have robust spill contingency plans 
and clear guidelines for contractor selection and oversight. Investors 
also want to make sure the compensation and incentive packages for 
senior management include specific links to environmental health and 
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. 
110 As mentioned earlier, the oil industry argues that BP is a rogue company and that it 
has safety issues. John M. Broder, Oil Executives Break Ranks and Criticize BP at Congressional 
Hearing, N.Y. Times, June 16, 2010, at A20 (“The chairmen of four of the world’s largest oil 
companies broke their nearly two-month silence on the major spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
on Tuesday and publicly blamed BP for mishandling the well that caused the disaster.”). 
According to an October 15, 2010 Federal Register notice publishing a final rule that 
strengthens to a modest degree the existing requirement that all offshore facilities imple-
ment “environmental management systems,” BOEMRE reported that “[m]ost comments 
expressed the view that the safety and environmental protection record of the offshore 
industry is excellent, and that imposing these new requirements is not justified.” Oil and 
Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610, 63,612 (Oct. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 30 
C.F.R. pt. 250) (strengthening the existing system of regulation that requires all offshore 
facilities to institute an environmental management system). 
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safety targets.”111 These concerns reflect an astute fingering of two of 
the most important problems now undermining offshore safety: the di-
vided authority exerted onsite by diverse corporate entities that have 
conflicting economic interests, and top management’s neglect of safety 
wering incentives to come up with a 
yst
efinery that killed fifteen people in March 2005. The re-
port
it for a broader audience. We are under no illusion that defi-
                                                                                                                     
issues. 
 Divided authority occurs because, unlike the vast majority of indus-
trial sites, offshore facilities house workers employed by the company 
that officially owns the rig or platform, along with a variety of inde-
pendent contractors. In unraveling the causes of the Deepwater Hori-
zon disaster, investigators have been compelled to disentangle the cul-
pability of Transocean, the owner of the rig that was leased by BP; 
Halliburton, the company that provided the cement used to suppress 
volatile gases in the well; and BP itself.112 Those reports indicate that 
BP wanted the drilling to be completed as quickly as possible, while its 
drilling contractors had minimal economic incentives to rush their 
work.113 Bickering over how to complete this work was one cause of the 
accident.114 The distinct corporate entities involved in onsite decision-
making obviously require overpo
cr al clear chain of command. 
 The problem of top management neglect is underscored by the 
conclusions of independent investigations into BP’s operations in 
North America.115 The common themes of these reports are best sum-
marized by the findings of a review commission headed by former Sec-
retary of State James A. Baker III that investigated the explosion at BP’s 
Texas City R
 stated: 
 Although we necessarily direct our report to BP, we intend 
 
111 Henshall, supra note 25. 
112 See, e.g., Ben Casselman & Russell Gold, Unusual Decisions Set Stage for BP Disaster, 
Wall St. J., May 27, 2010, at A1 (explaining the conflicting pressures and resulting disso-
nance among BP and its contractors in the events leading up to the spill). 
113 See id. 
114 See, e.g., Douglas A. Blackmon et al., There Was ‘Nobody in Charge,’ After the Blast, Hori-
zon Was Hobbled by a Complex Chain of Command, Wall St. J., May 27, 2010, at A6 (reporting 
that the only person who noticed that the rig had not sent a “Mayday” call to onshore ex-
ecutives and took upon herself the job of calling in the alarm was reprimanded for taking 
such action without the express authorization by other higher ranking officials who were 
milling around the deck); see also Casselman & Gold, supra note 112, at A1. 
115 See, e.g., James A. Baker, III, The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Re-
view Panel, at viii (2007) [hereinafter Baker Report], available at http://www.bp.com/liveas- 
sets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/SP/STAGING/local_assets/assets/pdfs/Baker 
_panel_report.pdf; Frontline: The Spill, supra note 15. 
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ciencies in process safety culture, management, or corporate 
oversight are limited to BP. . . . 
 The passing of time without a process accident is not neces-
sarily an indication that all is well and may contribute to a 
dangerous and growing sense of complacency. When people 
lose an appreciation of how their safety systems were intended 
to work, safety systems and controls can deteriorate, lessons 
can be forgotten, and hazards and deviations from safe oper-
ating procedures can be accepted. Workers and supervisors 
can increasingly rely on how things were done before, rather 
than rely on sound engineering principles and other controls. 
People can forget to be afraid.116 
 Until and unless an independent regulatory agency is established, 
and given adequate resources and political support, safety cases should 
not come to America. In the interim, the best we can do is to turn to 
another well-established government tool—in a word, liability, imposed 
by high-profile lawsuits brought by Attorney General Eric Holder and 
pursued with the full resources of the Justice Department behind them. 
On December 15, 2010, Holder announced such a case against BP and 
Transocean seeking civil damages.117 Criminal charges are still under 
consideration and will pack an even more powerful deterrent than civil 
penalties in amounts easily absorbed by the mammoth company. These 
actions are a start, and the best hope of averting any more such trage-
dies. 
 
116 Baker Report, supra note 115, at i. 
117 John Schwartz, U.S. Sues Company for Spill Damages, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A30 
(explaining that the complaint filed in the case does not specify the amount of damages 
the Justice Department is seeking, but the fines and penalties available under the law 
could total tens of billions of dollars). 
